Voting in The Hague: Chemical weapons and principles

At the end of November 2025, the 30th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention took place in The Hague. Ukraine was once again elected to the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), while Russia, for the third consecutive time, received the lowest level of support. Why has Russia lost these elections three times in a row? And does it have any chance of returning?

It is widely recognised that African states play an important and at times decisive role in global international organisations. Their position, including within the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, is often pivotal. In many cases, it is African votes that determine whether international law functions as an instrument of justice or remains a declaration without consequences.

Ghana has always been, and continues to be, a moral compass for Africa. As the country of Kwame Nkrumah and the first nation, south of the Sahara, to gain independence, Ghana has a unique opportunity to set an example of principled leadership on matters of law. As a result, Ukraine pays close attention to the official Ghanaian position before every important international vote.

Use of Prohibited Weapons

From February 2023 to January 2026, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence documented 12,016 cases of Russia’s use of munitions containing prohibited chemical agents. This information was confirmed by three independent OPCW reports issued in November 2024, February 2025, and June 2025. On 27 November 2025, 55 States Parties to the Convention signed a joint statement condemning Russia’s actions.

Russian forces have used grenades filled with toxic CS and CN gases, delivering them by drones. The purpose is to force Ukrainian defenders out of shelters, after which they are targeted by direct fire or artillery. More than 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers have suffered chemical injuries of varying severity.

The use of chemical weapons against Ukraine is not unprecedented. In Syria—Ghouta (2013, more than 1,400 civilians killed, including 426 children), Khan Shaykhun (2017), and Douma (2018)—hundreds of innocent lives were taken by chemical weapons during a conflict in which Russia played a key role in supporting the Assad regime.

In response to substantiated accusations, Russian diplomacy has repeatedly employed the same well-established pattern: initial silence, followed by denial, then accusations that the victims staged provocations, and finally the blocking of international investigations at the UN Security Council.

In March 2018, for example, Russia used the military-grade nerve agent Novichok on British territory against Sergei and Yulia Skripal. In response to London’s outrage, Moscow advanced more than twenty mutually contradictory explanations. International investigations long ago established Russia’s responsibility, yet for the eighth consecutive year, Moscow continues to deny it.

In 2014, a Russian Buk missile shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, killing 298 innocent people. An international investigation established the facts, and a court in The Hague delivered its verdict. Nevertheless, Russia has now denied responsibility for twelve years.

Syria, the United Kingdom, MH17, Ukraine—these are not isolated incidents but a recurring behavioural pattern of a state that deliberately and flagrantly violates international law while persistently evading accountability.

The African Experience

Russia violates international law not only in Europe or the Middle East. Several African states are also familiar with the Russian methods of expanding influence.

Mozambique (2019–2024): Through the private military company Wagner (now the “African Corps”), Russia provided “assistance” in Cabo Delgado province. Independent investigations documented numerous violations of international humanitarian law. After early failures, Russian mercenaries withdrew, leaving the situation unstable.

Central African Republic: Wagner’s presence is linked to control over gold and diamond mines. The UN mission in CAR (MINUSCA) documented numerous human rights violations. Profits from natural resources are extracted from a country that remains among the poorest in the world.

Mali: After Wagner’s arrival in 2021, violence against civilians increased by 278% (Human Rights Watch). The 2022 massacre in Moura resulted in more than 300 civilian deaths. UN and French forces withdrew, yet the anticipated stabilisation did not occur.

Sudan: Wagner and the African Corps supply weapons to both sides of the conflict. The civil war has claimed over 150,000 lives and triggered the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, according to the UN. Sudanese gold is exported through illegal schemes while the country descends into catastrophe.

Libya: Russian mercenaries supported Khalifa Haftar and, after retreating from Tripoli, left behind thousands of anti-personnel mines that continue to kill civilians.

This pattern of Russian actions in Africa mirrors what the world witnessed in Syria and now sees in Ukraine: military presence without accountability, resource exploitation, regional destabilisation, and rejection of responsibility.

In Russia, there is a fond nostalgia for the Soviet-era narrative of “assistance” to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. However, only the positive aspects are usually recalled such as education programmes, medical aid, student scholarships. But the harsh truth cannot be denied, the most common symbol of Moscow’s “assistance” to Africa has become the Kalashnikov rifle. Russians take pride in the fact that this weapon of death appears even on the coats of arms of some African states. Rarely is there any reflection on how much blood has been spilled, how many lives have been lost to weapons manufactured in Russia and carefully shipped to Africa.

Another distinct Russian tool is disinformation. Media outlets created specifically for this purpose, such as Russia Today and Sputnik Africa, promote narratives about “Western neocolonialism” while ignoring the crimes of Russian mercenaries in Mali, CAR, or Sudan. This creates a distorted picture of reality that prevents African societies from making informed decisions about their own security.

Why This Matters for Africa

The question may seem reasonable: why should Africa, in addition to its own challenges, concern itself with Ukraine’s problems and a war in distant Europe?

The answer is simple as this is not about geography, but about principles, the same principles on which African states built their independence in the 1950s and 1960s: sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the right of people to self-determination.

If Russia is allowed to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention with impunity after 12,016 documented cases, it would mean that legal norms no longer protect the weak from the strong. This affects not only Ukraine but all states that rely on international law as protection against aggression.

If Russia returns to the OPCW Executive Council for the 2027–2029 term despite three official OPCW reports confirming its violations, this would set a dangerous precedent: violations carry no consequences, and violators may govern institutions created to prevent those very violations.

Neutrality on fundamental principles protects no one. It merely enables violators to continue acting with impunity until the next victim appears.

A Shared Historical Experience

The Ashanti people have a symbol called Sankofa—a bird that looks backward while moving forward. To move into the future, one must remember the past.

Africa remembers colonialism. It remembers how the strong dictated terms to the weak, exploited resources, and imposed their will by force. This is precisely what Nkrumah and his generation fought against. It is also what the post–World War II international legal system was designed to prevent.

What is happening in Africa today, the presence of Russian mercenaries, control over natural resources, regional destabilisation, reproduces a familiar pattern. A different era, different slogans (“multipolarity,” “anti-imperialism”), but the same essence: exploitation disguised as assistance.

A Ghanaian proverb says: “Tiki di nketenkete”—“Truth is like fire; you cannot hide it under a pot.”

12,016 documented cases are facts. Three OPCW reports are facts. Russian crimes in Mozambique, Mali, CAR, and Sudan are documented facts recognised by international organisations. Three consecutive years of voting results in The Hague show that the international community sees these facts and acts accordingly.

Ukraine does not ask the Government of Ghana or other African governments to take sides. We ask only for consistent defence of the principles that underpin international order: the prohibition of chemical weapons, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and accountability for violations.

When the next elections to the OPCW Executive Council take place in 2027, African states will again have the opportunity to demonstrate that violations have consequences, that states which breach the most fundamental prohibitions, such as the ban on chemical weapons, cannot govern institutions created to prevent such crimes.

Today, Ukraine is fighting for the same values that Ghana fought for in 1957: the right to exist as an independent state; the right to its own identity and culture; the right not to be absorbed by an empire that imposes its will through force and prohibited weapons.

The coming years will show whether the world can maintain unity in defending international law. They will show whether African states, having themselves gained freedom through struggle against colonialism, will support those who today defend the same principles against a new form of imperial aggression.

This is not a matter of geographic solidarity. It is a matter of principled choice regarding international law, which protects all states, large and small alike. Africa will make this choice independently, guided by its own experience and its own interest in a stable and predictable world order.

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Authored by Ivan Lukachuk, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Ukraine in the Republic of Ghana